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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF CONGRESS TO NULLIFY
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.

Chief Justice Hughes, when Governor of New York, once said,
"We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges
say it is." 1 That this statement is true admits of no doubt. The
history of the Supreme Court shows that, from the days of Chief
Justice Marshall until this very minute, the Constitution has been
subjected to judicial enlargement, interpretation and invention. 2 Today, "the Court, as heir to the accumulated doctrines of its predecessors, now finds itself in possession of such a variety of instruments
of constitutional exegesis that it is able to achieve almost any result
in the field of constitutional interpretation which it considers desirable, and that without flagrant departure from judicial good form." 3
This capability of variable achievement is by no means capricious and dependent solely upon the whim of the Court. The fundamental principles of the Constitution must be subserved, but because
the Constitution is not a fixed definition of static rights as of the day
of its adoption and was designed rather as a document capable of
reflecting future economic and social changes, 4 these principles must
be taken into consideration by the Court. It must, in the words of
Justice Cardozo, "exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life." 5 In other words, the
broad discretion of the Court, finding its reason of necessity in the
Constitution, is tinged with an equally5abroad moral responsibility for
the safety and welfare of the nation.
Nowhere was this psychology of the Court more forcefully revealed than in the "Gold Cases." 6 Confronted with a situation which,
because of the pressing needs of the national economy, required immediate solution, the Court, because of the gravity of the decision,
took almost a month to decide the cases. What the Court was going
1HUGHES,
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(1934) 180 et seq.
3 Id. at 181.
'1 WILLOUGHBY ON THE CONST. OF THE U. S. (2d ed. 1929) §43; THE
FEDERALIST, No. XXXI (1788) 182; CORWIN, srupra note 2, at 7.
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to decide, no one could forecast. 7 Strong arguments based on judicial precedent were advanced by both sides. 8 Which way would the
Court turn?, Would it consider upholding the sanctity of the obligations of private contracts a social duty paramount in importance
to that of upholding the monetary policy of Congress; a tenet closer
in harmony to the fundamental principles of the Constitution? Would
it approve the partial repudiation by Congress of government bonds
and promises as "the primordial necessity of order in the social life,"
or would it consider such repudiation an act too dangerous to the
public welfare and security and too far removed from fundamental
principles to condone? What the Court decided is history. It remains for us to analyze the decisions and to try to uncover the reasoning underlying them.
Virtually all private and public bonds outstanding in 1933 contained the gold clause which, though slightly different in language
in individual cases, was of the same general import; 9 that is, a promise to pay to the obligee.in gold coin. The object of the clause was
to protect the parties against inflation and deviation from the gold
standard, though it must be confessed that, until the present economic
depression, the possibility of such changes was always remote and
of little weight in the minds of the contracting parties. 10 Nevertheless, it has been estimated that anywhere from 50 to 100 billion
dollars of the funded indebtedness in this country contained at the
time a gold clause or a modification thereof."
The impossibility of actually redeeming all these obligations in
gold coin led to two serious dangers which threatened what economic
security remained; first, the tendency to hoard gold; second, the
tendency of capital to leave the country.' 2 In recognition of the
danger and to alleviate the situation, 'Congress took legislative action
and by a Joint Resolution on June 5, 1933 declared such clauses void
and all obligations containing them dischargeable in any current legal
7N. Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1935, at 1, col. 2; N. Y. World-Telegram, Jan. 21,
1935, at 17; N. Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 16, 1935, at 1.
8
N. Y. Times, Jan. 9 to 12, 1935, at 1.
'The gold clauses contained in the obligations sued on in the instant

cases are indicative of the language used. In the Norman case, the bond
provided for the payment of principal and interest in gold coin of the United
States of America of or equal to the standard of weight and fineness existing
on the date of issue; in the Bankers Trust Co. case (decided in the same
opinion with the Norman case), the bond provided for payment of principal
and interest in gold coin of the United States of the present standard of
weight and fineness; the gold certificate in the Nortz case contained a promise
to pay $1,000 in gold coin payable to the bearer on demand; and in the Perry
case, the Liberty Bond provided that "the principal and interest hereof are
payable in United States gold coin of the present standard of value."
a°Nebolsine, Gold Clause in Private Contracts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1051-2.
"Ibid, n. 3; Post and Willard, Power of Congress to Nullify Gold
Clauses (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1225, n. 2; N. Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1935, at 1;
N. Y. World-Telegram, supra note 7.
'Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra note 6, at 418.
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tender, dollar for dollar. 13 The resolution included within its scope
government obligations. 14 This act was only one cog in the legislative and executive machinery set moving to prevent the efflux of
gold from the country and the hoarding of gold within its borders. 15
The culmination of the entire process resulted in the President's
proclamation on January 31, 1934, when he fixed the weight of the
gold dollar at 15 5/21 grains nine-tenths fine, 16 a reduction of 41
17
per centum from its previous weight of 25.8 grains nine-tenths fine.
By reason of the Joint Resolution and the President's proclamation of January 31, 1934, holders of private or public bonds were
affected in this fashion-they could be repaid only in current legal
tender (the status of gold as legal tender had been abolished 1s) and
they had to accept a dollar for dollar amount despite the devaluation of the gold dollar. Four test cases arose almost immediately:
1. Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., a suit on a coupon of
a bond issued by the defendant, 19
2. In re Missouri Pac. R. Co., a suit on matured bonds, 20
3.

Nortz v. U. S., a suit on gold certificates surrendered
under protest to the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant
to his order of January 15, 1934,21

4.

Perry v. U. S., a suit on a Liberty Bond called for redemption on April 15, 1934.22

The first two being suits on private bonds were disposed of in one
opinion; the other two, involving different questions, were decided
in separate opinions.
23
In the first decision, entitled Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.,
the validity of the Joint Resolution was upheld. It was the contention of the plaintiffs that the resolution was unconstitutional, first,
because it operated to deprive them of their property without due
process of law, in that it destroyed valuable contract rights by denying effect to gold clauses in existing contracts in violation of the
112, 31 U. S. C. A. §463 (1933).
" Perry v. United States, supra note 6, at 434.
"See Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra note 6, at 410 et seq., for
an excellent review of the action taken by the President and Congress from
March 6, 1933 to Jan. 31, 1934.
' Executive Order of Jan. 31, 1934 (No. 2072), 31 U. S. C. A. §821, note.
'31 STAT. 45 (1900), 31 U. S. C. A. §314 (1925).
" Executive Order of March 10, 1933 (No. 6073), 12 U. S. C. A. §95,
note; Executive Order of April 5, 1933 (No. 6102), 12 U. S. C. A. §248, note.
"265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E. 726 (1934); (1934) 9 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 197;
(1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 682.
' 7 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Mo. 1934) ; (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 88.
1841 STAT.

'tSupra
note 6, on certificate from the Court of Claims.
'Supra note 6, on certificate from the Court of Claims.
'Supra note 6.
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Fifth Amendment, 24 and second, because it violated the Tenth Amendment.25 The argument on this score was advanced by counsel for
Mr. Norman as follows: "Since this is a government of enumerated powers and no provision is made whereby Congress can impair
contracts, it follows that it has no such power." 26
The answer of the Court to these contentions is a model of constitutional interpretation and reasoning. Finding first that the contracts before them were contracts for the payment of money and
27
not for the payment in gold coin as a commodity, or in bullion,
it then proceeded to examine (1) the power of Congress to establish a monetary system; (2) the power of Congress to invalidate
the provisions of existing contracts which interfere with the exercise
of its constitutional authority; and (3) the effect of the gold clauses
in relation to the monetary policy adopted by Congress.
The express grant to Congress of the power "to coin money,
regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," 28 the Court states,
is not the full measure of Congressional authority in relation to the
currency. The related powers "to lay and collect taxes, to borrow
money, to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, to fix the standards of weights and measures, together with the express power "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the enumerated powers" 29 comprise, with the express grant
of power, the comprehensive authority of Congress over matters of
finance, revenue and currency. Since entire power over the currency
is vested in Congress, it has been held that Congress may eliminate
state bank notes from circulation in order to exclude the use of all
currencies but its own,30 it may declare something besides gold and
silver legal tender,31 and it may exercise the money3 2power and the
power of eminent domain to prohibit gold hoarding.
But, plaintiff contended, the power of Congress to establish a
monetary system cannot be extended to the striking down of express
2' U. S. CONsT. AMEND. V. (No person * * * shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.)
'U.
S. CONsT. AMEND. X. (The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.)
N. Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1935, at 2.
'Since the Court in its opinion declares that the validity of the Joint
Resolution would have been upheld in either case, further discussion of the
differences in legal effect of these interpretations will not be attempted here.
The interested reader will find a keen analysis of this problem in Nebolsine,

Gold Clause it; Private Contracts, supra note 10.
IU. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, par. 5.

Id. Art. I, §8, par. 18.
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
"Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870); Juillard v. Greenman,
110 U. S.421, 4 Sup. Ct. 122 (1884).
Campbell v. Chase National Bank, 5 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1933);
cf. Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U. S. 302, 31 Sup. Ct. 21 (1910) (the
power to coin money involves the power to prohibit its export, mutilation and
melting).
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contracts for gold payments. To this the Court answered, "contracts,
however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the
Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but, when contracts deal with a subject-matter which lies within the control of the
Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove
their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional powers
by making contracts about them.33 Such contracts must be understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of
the rightful authority of the Government. 34 Moreover, the exercise
of rightful authority has not been limited in its validity to where its
interference with private contracts has been an incidental effect, but
it has also been upheld where, in the carrying out of a lawful policy,
and invalidated contracts previously made
it has expressly prohibited
3 5
and valid when made.

With these principles in mind, the Court proceeded to answer
the question, "Did the gold clauses before them interfere with the
policy of Congress in the exercise of its authority to establish the
monetary system of the country?" The Court used the test of
McCulloch v. Maryland; 36 that is, whether the action of Congress
bore a reasonable relation to a legitimate end or was solely capricious
and arbitrary. 37 Reviewing the circumstances outlined above, which
called into being the Joint Resolution, the Court found that Congress, to reach a legitimate end (the establishment of a sound monetary system), was entitled to reject a dual system in which gold
was above a parity with other legal tender and adopt a uniform
system placing all legal tender on a parity and withdrawing gold from
circulation, thereby destroying its status as legal tender; that the
means adopted bore a reasonable relation to the end; and that gold
clauses in private contracts must give way to the declared policy
of Congress. The purpose of the Resolution was "not to confiscate
property but to restore normal and sound valuations of property." 38
The dissenting justices 39 could not see eye to eye with the majority. To them, "the end or objective of the Joint Resolution was
INorman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., mtpra note 6, at 416.
-Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870) ; Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 357, 28 Sup. Ct. 529 (1907) ; Louisville & Nashville
R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 482, 31 Sup. Ct. 265 (1910) ; Ufiited States
v. Southern Pac. Co., 259 U. S. 214, 234, 42 Sup. Ct. 496 (1921) ; Stephenson
v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 276, 53 Sup. Ct. 181 (1932) ; BuRwIcK, THE AmiuCAN CONSTITUTION

(1922) §91.

"' Mondou v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 52, 32 Sup. Ct. 169

(1911); Phila., Balt. & Wash. R. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603, 32 Sup.
Ct. 589 (1911); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 390, 52 Sup. Ct. 581
(1931).
4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819). 'Id. at 421, 423.
"Collier, Gold Contracts and Legislative Power (1934) 2 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 303, 362.

"They were Messrs. Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter. Sutherland and
Butler, the so-called "conservative" group on the Supreme Court bench.
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not 'legitimate.' The real purpose was 'not to assure uniform value
to the coins and currencies of the United States,' but to destroy certain valuable contract rights." 40 The Fifth Amendment they considered to be an insuperable bar to the validity of the Resolution.
If the destruction of the gold clauses was for public benefit, they
argued, then proper compensation was essential; if for private benefit, the due process clause barred the way. To acquiesce in the confiscation of property rights would be to fail in their "obligation of
responsibility."
Will not the careful student of the majority and the dissenting
opinions come to the conclusion that, in their honest search for the
fundamental principles of the Constitution pertinent to the question
before them, the justices who upheld the validity of the Joint Resolution found the fundamental principle to be "the primordial order
of necessity in the social life," while the dissenting justices were
concerned more with the rights of the individual? For it is true
that "the greatest problem of statesmanship at the present time is to
preserve the fundamental rights of the individual as guaranteed by
the Constitution without impairing the power of the government-to
undertake measures essential to the general welfare." 41 Which of
the two considerations will prevail in any given case, depends largely
on which the judges consider to be more fundamentally aligned with
the purpose of the Constitution.
No questioif of the validity of the Joint Resolution was broached
in the case of Nortz v. U. S. There it was one only of just compensation. The basis of plaintiff's claim was that he was entitled,
by the terms of the gold certificates, to receive gold coin when he
turned them in on January 17, 1934; that for each $20.67 of certificates, he was entitled to one ounce of gold which in the gold markets
of the day was worth $33.43; and that the difference between what
he received in legal tender non-redeemable in gold and what the
equivalent number of gold coin dollars would have brought him in
the world market was the measure of his damages. To this the Court'
made answer that the gold certificates were not warehouse receipts
calling for a quantity of gold as a commodity or bullion, but currency
calling for dollars. Therefore, if plaintiff had received dollars in
gold coin, he would have forthwith been required to deliver them
up to the treasury under the applicable legislation and orders, receiving legal tender in return. He could not export it or deal in it. The
value of gold in the world market could mean nothing to him, since
Congress had prohibited its exportation. 42 He therefore suffered no
"Norman

v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., supra note 6, at 425.

"1Parker, Federal Constitution in a Period of Change (1934) 9 JoUR.
NAT. Ass'N OF REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY 79.
2Ling Su Fan v. United States, supra note 32; Executive Orders, supra
note 18.
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actual damages and since the Court of Claims "was not instituted to
try such a case," 13 his cause of action could not be entertained.
The dissent interpreted the gold certificates to be warehouse
receipts for the return of gold left on deposit and from this premise
concluded that Congress had broken the promise of the Government
to return it and that plaintiff suffered actual damages thereby. If
we adopt this premise, the conclusion is correct. But that the premise
adopted by the majority is the correct one is more amenable to reason, especially when we consider that had it been in the mind of
Congress to constitute the gold certificates warehouse receipts, it
would not have provided that the amount of the certificates outstanding "shall not at any time exceed twenty per centum beyond
the amount of coin and bullion in the treasury." 44 Were these certificates warehouse receipts, their number could not exceed the amount
of gold on deposit.
In the opinion of the writer, the last case, Perryv. U. S., is the
most interesting of all. There suit was brought on a $10,000 Liberty
Bond containing a gold clause, which matured April 15, 1934. It
was presented for payment; plaintiff demanded 10,000 gold dollars
of 25.8 grains .9 fine or 16,931.35 gold dollars of 15 5/21 grains
.9 fine or $16,931.35 in legal tender currency. The defendant tendered $10,000 in legal tender currency and refused plaintiff's demands, on the authority of the Joint Resolution. This, plaintiff
claimed, was unconstitutional for the same reasons advanced by the
plaintiffs in the Noriunan case.
The Court followed a different line of reasoning in dealing with
this case, but reached the same practical result. The question as
they saw it was "whether the Congress can use that power [to establish a monetary system] so as to invalidate the terms of the obligations which the Government has theretofore issued in the exercise
of the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States." 45
The promise in the bond to repay in gold coin of the present standard of value was intended to afford protection against loss through
a possible subsequent standard lower in value. This promise, on the
Government's. plighted faith, based on express constitutional authority to borrow money and fix the terms of payment, 46 Congress could
not later repudiate under the guise of establishing a monetary policy.
While Congress can control private contracts which interfere with
the exercise of its constitutional authority, yet in respect of its own
engagements, the Government is competent to make them binding 47
'Grant v. United States, 7 Wall. 331, 338 (U. S. 1868) ; Marion & Rye
Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 280, 282, 46 Sup. Ct. 253 (1925).
" 12 STAT.711 (1863), 31 U. S. C. A. §428 (1925).
" Perry v. United States, supra note 6, at 434, 435.
U. S. CONsT. Art I, §9, par. 2.
a Perry v. United States, supra note 6, at 436, n. 3.
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and incurs rights and responsibilities similar to those of individuals.4 8
The Constitution expressly forbids the questioning of the validity
of the public debt. 49 It would seem, therefore, that in this country,
where the actions of the administrative bodies of the Government
are open to judicial review, wholesale repudiation of government
debts like those instanced across the Atlantic are impossible.
Having found that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, in so
far as it attempted to override the obligation created by the bond
in suit went beyond the congressional power, the Court goes on to
the question of damages and, following the reasoning of the Nortz
case, finds that the plaintiff suffered only nominal damages, and hence
has no action. "This," the dissenting opinion declares, "amounts to
a declaration that the government may give with one hand and take
away with the other." 50 With the conclusion that the government
could not repudiate its engagements it agreed, but the damages, in
accordance with the reasoning running throughout the dissent, it
held to be substantial. Justice Stone, on the other hand, handed
down a concurring opinion in which he said, "As much as I deplore
this refusal to fulfill the solemn promise of bonds of the Uhited
States, I cannot escape the conclusion, announced for the Court,
that in the situation now presented, the government, through the
exercise of its sovereign power to regulate the value of money, has
rendered itself immune from liability for its action." 51 It appeared
to him that in placing government obligations on a higher plane
than private bonds, the Court was imposing serious restrictions in
the path of measures to stabilize the dollar, because then actual damages might be shown.
It appears that the Court was unwilling to sanction the repudiation of government engagements, because to do so would constitute
the pledge of the United States an illusory and vain promise and place
us in the category of the European debtor nations, but it was equally
unwilling to jeopardize the program of stabilization which Congress
had undertaken for the benefit of the people. The result was a
compromise in which only four of the justices could acquiesce. But
since Justice Stone's misgivings could easily be dispelled by legislative restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 52 the opinions present a unified front of approval of measures taken to rehabilitate the economic security and the public welfare of the nation.
ANTHONY CURRERI.

'

Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700 (1878) ; United States v. Bank of the

Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377 (U. S. 1841)
be sued without its consent).
'U.

(except that the United States cannot

S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV.

'Norman v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., mtpra note 6, at 426.
' Perry v. United States, supra note 6, at 438.
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